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THE "R" WORD
M. Gregg Bloche and Elizabeth R. Jungman
In American politics, health care rationing is the "R" word. Among
people trying to win elections, the "R word" is an epithet invoked to
attack the other guy's medical cost control proposals. Honest talk about
the need to withhold beneficial care in order to restrain health spending is
as welcome in American public life as are Sally Hemmings' descendents at
a Jefferson family reunion. In 1994, Congressional Republicans rolled out
the "R" word to condemn the Clinton Administration health reform plan.'
A few years later, Democrats returned the favor, deploying the "R" word
against Republican efforts to coax Medicare beneficiaries into managed
care.2
In the medical marketplace competitors act similarly. Rival health
plans do not post billboards on the sides of buses promoting their ability to
efficiently withhold beneficial care. Their advertisements and coverage
contracts typically promise all "medically necessary" treatment,
encouraging subscribers to expect care without compromise. Although
market-oriented health policy commentators have urged managed health
plans to be explicit in their contracts about the need to set limits on
potentially beneficial care, the industry has not done so. Republicans,
Democrats, and HMO executives are in agreement about what American
health care consumers do not want to hear.
In June 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court broke the political silence about
the need to say no. With bracing candor, the Court proclaimed that health
care rationing is not only routine in America but, a matter of national
policy.3 Writing for a unanimous court in Pegram v. Herdrich, Justice
David Souter said, "inducement to ration care goes to the very point of
any HMO scheme."4 Justice Souter noted that Congress has, since 1973,
promoted the formation of HMOs through the HMO Act.. Congress,
1. M. Gregg Bloche & Peter D. Jacobson, The Supreme Court and Bedside
Rationing, 284 JAMA 2776 (2000) citing Robert Pear, Cuts in Medicare are on the
table, but peril is seen, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1994, at A4.
2. Bloche & Jacobson, supra note 1, at 2776 citing Joan Beck, Elderly being
used as pawns in health-care debate, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15, 1998.
3. Pegram v. Herdich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
4. Id. at 212.
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Justice Souter wrote, has thereby endorsed "the profit incentive to ration
care."
5
Over the next few years, pressure to say no to health care spending will
increase greatly. Post-September 11"h spending on defense and domestic
security, a huge federal tax cut, the recent recession's effects on
employment, and consumer demand translate into less money for public
and private medical coverage. Meanwhile, after several years in which
health care spending remained almost flat, medical costs are again rising
rapidly. Private insurance companies are hiking premiums by double-digit
percentages,6 and Medicare and Medicaid face similar cost pressures.
Medicare is containing costs by limiting provider payments to the point
that a growing numbers of doctors are abandoning the program or limiting
their participation. This is almost certain to prove politically
unsustainable. If and when Medicare payment rates reach levels that
jeopardize large numbers of American seniors' access to care, they will
make their voices heard in potent fashion. Medicaid cost increases
threaten the solvency of the state governments, crowding out spending on
education, public health, and economic development.7
Yet political talk about the need to say "no" to beneficial care remains
taboo. Prescription drug benefits for seniors and the rights of private
health insurance subscribers vis-a-vis managed health plans were the
principal health care issues in national politics as the 2002 midterm
elections approached. Discussion of alternative cost-containment
strategies has no place in the current debate or in managed health plans'
marketing efforts.
Political stump speakers promise to take medical decision-making
power from HMO bean counters and return it to doctors.8 But since the
5. Id. at 233.
6. Reed Abelson, Hard Decisions for Employers as Costs Soar in Health Care,
N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2002, at Cl; Week in Review: CalPERS to Hike Health
Insurance Premiums, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2002, at Bus. 2.
7. Robert Pear, Governors Say States Needs More Federal Help to Deal With
Rising Costs of Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2002, at A16 (quoting the
governor's policy statement as saying that, "[t]he current fiscal crisis for states,
compounded by unsustainable growth in the Medicaid program, is creating a
situation in which states are faced with either making massive cuts in programs or
being forced to raise taxes significantly.").
8. See e.g. Rep. Dennis Hastert, Putting Patients First, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
4, 2001, at A15 (asserting that the patients' bill of rights takes decisions away from
HMO accountants and gives them back to doctors); Megan Garvey, Unlikely
Leaders Face Off Over Patients' Rights, L.A. TIMES, July 5, 2001, at A14 (reporting
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late 1990s, health plan managers have been doing so, to manage costs in
"don't ask, don't tell" fashion. Rather then paying bean counters to set
limits, health plans are paying doctors to do the bean counting: to ration
care at the bedside, often without their patients knowing it. Afraid of
possible tort liability and under pressure from health care consumers, who
hate HMO bureaucrats, health plans have increasingly delegated
utilization management to treating physicians and put these physicians at
large financial risk for the cost of care.9
The financial and administrative mechanisms involved are complicated.
Myriad capitation and profit-sharing schemes, withholding arrangements,
and bonuses for frugality reward health care providers for clinical
restraint, often without regard for clinical outcomes. Various intervening
institutions play crucial roles. Health plans often contract with (and pay)
groups of physicians. These groups range from small partnerships of two
or more doctors in the same specialty to large, multi-specialty medical
groups, comprised of hundreds of physicians. Health plans pay these
groups, but money received by each group is then distributed to individual
doctors in accordance with the group's distinctive staff payment and
utilization management policies. Management, in short, has moved
centrifugally from HMO bureaucrats to the doctor's office, raising difficult
ethical questions about the dual roles and loyalties involved.
Pegram v. Herdrich involved a challenge to this shift toward reliance on
financial rewards to doctors for frugal practice. Dr. Lori Pegram, an
internist with an ownership interest in an HMO, waited for more than a
week to obtain an abdominal ultrasound for her patient, Cynthia
Herdrich, so that the test could be done at one of the HMO's facilities.
Herdrich's infected appendix ruptured in the meantime and she developed
peritonitis, a life-threatening infection of the abdominal cavity. She
survived and sued both Pegram and the HMO over the HMO's financial
incentives to physicians to limit care. She alleged that these incentives
encouraged Pegram to delay her ultrasound, putting her at increased risk
in order to obtain the test more cheaply at a plan-affiliated site.
that Sen. Bill Frist "talked passionately about patients he has seen and the need to
have doctors, not managed care bureaucrats, make medical decisions"); Clay
Robinson & Lisa Teachey, Last Stumping Effort Before Primary, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, March 10, 2002, at A35 (quoting U.S. Representative Ken Bentsen, a
candidate for Texas's open Senate seat, as saying that "[m]edical decisions should
be made by patients and doctors, not HMO bureaucrats.").
9. JAMES C. ROBINSON, THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE (1999).
10. Pegram, supra note 3, at 215.
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Contrary to what the managed care industry alleged, and some in the
media reported, the case involved neither a wholesale attack on managed
care nor a bid to outlaw all financial incentives to control costs. Herdrich
did not challenge the basic idea of prepaid care, the budgetary constraints
it makes inevitable, or utilization management and cost conscious clinical
practice. All of these have long been staples of managed care. She merely
asked the federal courts to construe an ambiguous federal statute" to set
limits on financial incentives to limit care. 2 But the Supreme Court flatly
rejected the proposition that federal law limits financial rewards to
physicians for frugality." The upshot after Pegram health plans have carte
blanche to offer financial incentives to physicians to withhold care, except
in so far as state law sets limits.
Many observers of American health policy are concerned by the
ethically troublesome role conflict that this legal environment permits, the
conflict between physicians' loyalty to individual patients and the pull of
monetary incentives (as well as responsibility for stewardship of collective
resources). 4 There are anecdotal reports that health plans are moving
away from such incentives out of concern of consumers' hostile reaction to
them. But if we reject this method of cost control, we need to look for
others so long as society demands that limits be set.
In Germany and the U.S., as elsewhere, society is demanding limits. In
most industrialized nations, including Germany, overall limits are set on a
more-or-less top-down basis, through global budgets that are allocated to
regions, health care organizations, and/or other institutions responsible for
providing care and managing costs. These institutions vary greatly.
Canada, for example, sets overall limits via province-wide health care
budgets. Negotiations between provincial health officials and medical care
11. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §1109(a)
(1994) ("Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan- who breaches any of
the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this
subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the
plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of
such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the
fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the
court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.").
12. Professor Jost discusses the ERISA statute in more detail in his
contribution to this issue.
13. Pegram, supra note 3, at 237 (holding that "mixed eligibility decisions by
HMO physicians are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA.").
14. Brief of Health Law, Policy and Ethics Scholars in Support of Respondent
at 15-16, Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000) (No. 98-1.949) (Dec. 20, 1999).
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providers determine how these budgets are distributed. The German
system of quasi-public, statutory health insurance entities, or "sickness
funds," tied to particular occupational groups, functions similarly:
"sickness fund" managers do much of the bargaining with providers that
provincial health officials do in Canada.
In the United States, limits are set in much more fragmented fashion. 5
As consumers, Americans contribute to the setting of limits in the private
health insurance market every time they purchase goods or services. If I
purchase a Ford instead of a Chevrolet and price is a factor, then I am part
of the process of setting limits on autoworkers' health care, since I am
putting market pressure on Ford and General Motors to constrain their
employee compensation, including health benefits. There are numerous
players in this process: consumers, employers who design compensation
packages to compete for workers, employees who make choices among
employers (and health plans) in part based on their marginal preferences
for salary versus health benefits, and public policymakers who define
market actors' tax and regulatory environments. The American system of
employer-provided medical coverage is a vector sum of the choices this
fragmented process generates. For Americans unhappy with this system's
limit-setting behavior, the "enemy" in the largest sense is us every time we
go to market.
Physicians in clinical practice in the U.S., Germany, and elsewhere
rarely take explicit account of medical costs. Indeed, most physicians view
the weighing of medical benefits against financial costs as unethical,
whether done by treating physicians or by drafters of clinical practice
protocols. Moreover, forthright balancing of costs and benefits is beset by
countless uncertainties, arising from insufficiency of scientific data about
the efficacy of clinical alternatives and lack of general agreement about
how to value clinical benefits in dollar terms6
Yet clinical practice norms incorporate implicit cost-benefit trade-offs' 7
Medical practice tends to put a premium on the value of life in rough
proportion to the immediacy of the threat to life. Medical practice norms
call for huge expenditures in the medical intensive care unit to buy days or
weeks of possible life. But when screening tests and prevention-oriented
services are at issue and clinical risk is remote, clinical practice norms
15. Public sector systems, such as Medicaid and Medicare, are not
incorporated into this argument.
16. M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming Jan. 2003).
17. HENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION:
RATIONING HOSPITAL CARE, 79-88, 134-135(1984).
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place lower implicit values on life. The law that governs clinical resource
allocation obscures this inconsistency. The opaque standard of medical
necessity, which governs medical insurance coverage in the private sector
by contract and in public programs by statute or regulation, permits the
making of inconsistent trade-offs without conscious reflection or
deliberation.
Legal opacity of this sort permits the making of painful, life-sacrificing
choices without widespread awareness of what is being sacrificed. There
is, perhaps, something to be said for collective self-deception in service of
social peace. But as pressures for cost control mount, so does the strain on
this method of society-wide self-deception. The popular backlash against
managed care over the past several years may well signal the breakdown
of this self-deception. In the long run, we will need to speak about the
unspeakable, if social support for cost containment that costs lives is to be
built and sustained. This means free-ranging discussion about how lives
and health status are to be valued and about how uncertainty about
treatment efficacy is to be counted in health care's cost-benefit calculus. It
means open discussion about permissible and impermissible links between
personal wealth and access to costly care."
It also means conversation about the extent to which medical care's
inconsistent valuations of life are ethically desirable or even ethically
tolerable. Does medicine's propensity to place higher valuations on years
(or days or weeks) of life saved at moments of life-or-death extremes than
in the design of health screening and promotion programs reflect
something inherent in human psychology - a cognitive bias toward rescue
over prevention? If so, should we treat this inclination as a truth of human
nature that should be incorporated into clinical and social ethics? Or,
should we treat this inclination as a cognitive error to be corrected via
public policymaking that demands consistent valuations of life across all
clinical contexts? Must any society that defers to popular choice, via
markets and politics, accept people's willingness to pay much more to save
a life year in the intensive care unit than in the outpatient clinic, when
doctors prescribe drugs for hypertension? Or is there something special
about medicine's caring role-its promise to keep faith with people in dire
need-something so special that its disparately low population-wide health
status payoff is ethically permissible? More broadly, should valuation of
life be equalized for all health-related public spending, on education,
18. In economics language, to what degree, if at all, is health care a "merit
good" that is, a good that society believes should be distributed in a more
egalitarian fashion than would be the case based on private purchasing power,
alone.
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environmental protection, occupational safety, economic development,
and other social programs. We know from abundant empirical evidence
that the health status of populations correlated more closely with socio-
economic class, education, and environmental determinants than with
health care spending. Does this knowledge support a large-scale resource
shift from medical care to social programs that achieve a higher health
payoff and, perhaps, greater social justice? Or is there something special
about medicine's caring role, its promise to keep faith with people in dire
need. Something so special that its disparately low population-wide health
status payoff is ethically permissible?
These questions hardly exhaust the range of issues that merit focus in
candid public discussion about limit-setting in the health sphere. But they
are a start. Sooner or later the cost of our technology will compel us to
transcend the taboo of the "R word." When this happens, we can hope
that the ensuing, painful discussion about how to set limits will push us
toward deeper reflection about the values at stake-and toward policies
that more faithfully express our moral inclinations.
20021

